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1. Introduction 
 
There are many cases in which firms acquire a stake in their rivals that gives them a 
share in the profit but not in the decision making of those rivals (see Gilo et al., 2006).
1 
These passive investments affect the production and thus the pollutant emissions of the 
firms. As a result, partial cross-ownership affects the strategic environmental policy of 
governments. However, it is generally assumed in literature on the environment that each 
firm is owned by a different shareholder (see, for example, Ulph, 1996; Duval and 
Hamilton, 2002). This paper examines the setting of cooperative and non-cooperative 
environmental taxes set by governments when cross-participation exists at ownership level.  
 
Determination of optimal environmental taxes has received considerable attention in 
the economic literature analyzing the environment. Pigouvian taxation is regarded as a 
benchmark according to which under perfect competition the optimal environmental tax is 
equal to the marginal environmental cost. However, as markets are not perfectly competitive 
it is of general interest to analyse optimal environmental taxes under imperfect competition.
2  
 
The problem of optimal environmental taxation considering a single market and 
imperfectly competitive firms was first analysed in Buchanan (1969) and then in Barnett 
(1980). They show that for an externality produced by a monopolist, the optimal tax is 
lower than the marginal environmental cost. The optimal tax consists of two parts: a 
Pigouvian tax (i.e. the marginal environmental cost), and a correction part due to the 
market power of the monopolist firm. This analysis has been extended to consider an 
oligopoly market.
3  
                                                           
1 For an explanation of why partial ownership arrangements are formed see Alley (1997). One of the reasons 
is that they alter the degree of competition in the industry (see, for example, Reynolds and Snapp, 1986; 
Farrell and Shapiro, 1990; Malueg, 1992; Ono et al., 2004; Gilo et al. 2006). 
2 See Requate (2006) for an excellent survey on this issue. 
3 In this regard see Simpson (1995), Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995) and Carlsson (2000). They show 
that the optimal tax is not necessarily lower than the marginal environmental cost. Optimal environmental 
policies have also been analyzed assuming that firms produce differentiated products (see, for example, 
Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas, 1996; Lange and Requate, 1999; and Fujiwara, 2009), and that private firms 
compete with public firms (see Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2006).   3
 
The literature on the environment has also analyzed strategic environmental policy 
when there is international trade and firms are imperfectly competitive. Considering 
Cournot competition, in this framework Barrett (1994) and Ulph (1996) show that when 
the firms located in each country are domestic-owned, national governments set emission 
standards such that the marginal cost of abatement is lower than the marginal damage 
caused by polluting emissions. Conrad (1993) assumes that firms sell in a third country’s 
market and shows that non-cooperative emission tax rates are lower than the tax that would 
be set by the governments if they coordinated their policies so as to maximize the joint 
welfare of the countries. The same result is obtained by Conrad (1996a) and Kennedy 
(1994) assuming that firms sells their products in a single market (that includes domestic 
consumers) and assuming transboundary pollution.
4  
 
  The design of environmental policy with imperfect competitive polluting industries 
has been extended to consider different types of asymmetries between countries. In this 
regard, Bárcena-Ruiz (2006) analyzes whether governments prefer to be leaders or 
followers in environmental policies when transboundary pollution is assumed. There is 
asymmetry in this model when the government sets taxes sequentially: otherwise the model 
is symmetric.
5 In the cooperative equilibrium taxes are greater than in the non-cooperative 
equilibrium independently of whether taxes are set sequentially or simultaneously. In the 
non-cooperative equilibrium, both countries set the same tax under simultaneous decisions; 
however, under sequential decisions the leader government in taxes sets a higher (lower) 
tax than the follower if transboundary spillovers are low (high) enough. 
 
                                                           
4 This analysis has been extended to consider Bertrand competition (see, for example, Conrad, 1996b; and 
Eerola, 2004). Another branch of the literature studies the interaction between strategic environmental policy 
and endogenous location of polluting firms (see, for example, Rauscher, 1995; Markusen, 1997; and 
Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón, 2003). 
5 This paper shows that whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in taxes depends on the degree 
to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners. When this overspill is low (high) enough, 
taxes are strategic complements (substitutes) and governments set taxes sequentially (simultaneously).   4
Duval and Hamilton (2002) extend the analysis of strategic environmental policy to 
consider market conditions characterized by various forms of international asymmetry.
6 They 
find that in the cooperative equilibrium the optimal tax under asymmetric-cost oligopoly does 
not involve taxes harmonized between countries (i.e. governments set different taxes); for other 
forms of asymmetry, policy harmonization is optimal. In the case of unbalanced trade (i.e. 
domestic consumption does not equal domestic production), a net exporting country has an 
incentive to raise its tax because a portion of the tax is shifted onto prices, where it 
disproportionately affects foreign consumers. For a general distribution of the global consumer 
base, they find that the motivation of the domestic country to capture oligopoly rent for its 
firms is countervailed by the desire of the regulator to shift the burden of the tax onto foreign 
consumers. As a result, a net exporting (importing) country has an incentive to set higher 
(lower) environmental taxes than would be efficient under cooperation.
7  
 
  In this paper we consider partial cross-ownership which means a different type of 
asymmetry between countries from that in the papers cited above. Under partial cross-
ownership one firm (firm s) owns a stake in its rival (firm r), but the control of each firm is 
exerted by its main shareholder. Firms are owned by investors from the country in which 
they are located: firm i is owned by investors from country i (i = r, s). Thus the ownership 
of the firms is asymmetrically distributed between investors from the two countries. We 
consider that pollution is local. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how partial 
cross-ownership affects the setting of cooperative and non-cooperative environmental 
taxes by governments.  
 
The issue that we analyze in this paper can be illustrated by taking the automobile 
industry as an example. In this industry there are examples of partial cross-ownership of 
rivals, e.g. the French firm Renault has formed a partnership with the Japanese firm 
Nissan. Renault currently holds a 44.3% equity stake in Nissan Motor and Nissan Motor 
                                                           
6 Asymmetries are expressed in terms of consumption (different number of consumers in each country), 
production (different numbers of firms in each country or different production costs), and environmental 
damage (various forms of transboundary pollution). 
7 In the case of balanced trade and no transboundary pollution, the optimal cooperative and non-cooperative 
taxes coincide. However, with transboundary pollution the net importer of pollution sets a lower tax than the 
net exporter as an incentive to increase domestic pollution.   5
owns a 15% stake in Renault (see www.renault.com).
8 Moreover, in advanced countries 
governments set environmental taxes to get firms to internalize the damage generated by 
their pollutant emissions (see, for example, European Environmental Agency, 2007). We 
set our model in this context. 
 
We consider first that countries set the environmental taxes that maximize the joint 
welfare of the two countries (cooperative taxes).
9 Partial cross-ownership of firm s reduces 
its production and emissions, which is taken advantage of by its rival to increase its own 
production and emissions. As a result, partial cross-ownership provides incentive for the 
countries to decrease the tax paid by firm s to avoid an excessive reduction of its production; 
however, it encourage the countries to increase the tax paid by the other firm to reduce its 
greater local environmental damage. As a result, equilibrium taxes are not harmonized and 
firm s (firm r) pays a less (more) tax than when there is no partial cross-participation. 
 
In the non-cooperative case, given that there is strategic interaction between 
governments when setting environmental taxes, the following effects are present: first, the 
rent capture effect, which lowers equilibrium taxes as each country attempts to gain a 
competitive advantage over the other; second, the pollution-shifting effect, which raises 
equilibrium taxes as each country attempts to transfer production and its associated 
pollution to the other. Finally, the above effects are influenced by partial cross-ownership. 
On the one hand, partial cross-ownership reduces market competition by increasing 
(decreasing) the incomes obtained by country s (country r). This means that the incentive 
to reduce taxes to capture rents from foreigners, the rent capture effect, is weakened for 
country s and strengthened for country r. On the other hand, firm s (firm r) produces and 
                                                           
8 Another example is the partial acquisition of Wilkinson by Gillette: Gillette acquired 22.9% of the 
nonvoting stock and approximately 13.6% of the debt of Wilkinson Sword, one of its largest rivals (see Gilo 
et al., 2006); the first firm is from the U.S.A while the second firm is from the U.K. 
9 When there is no cross-ownership the model is symmetric which implies that equilibrium taxes are 
harmonized (i.e. both governments set the same tax). As firms have market power and their production 
processes damage the environment, it is well known (see Barnett, 1980) that a tax on pollution emissions 
reduces the environmental damage caused by firms but also causes them to reduce their production further 
(from already sub-optimal levels). Therefore, environmental taxes are below marginal environmental damage 
to avoid an excessive reduction of production by firms.   6
pollutes less (more) than when there is no partial cross-ownership. As a result, the 
incentive to increase taxes to move production and its associated pollution to the other 
country, the pollution-shifting effect, is weakened for country s and strengthened for 
country r. Thus, country r (country s) sets a higher (lower) tax than when there is no partial 
cross-ownership since the pollution-shifting effect (the rent capture effect) dominates.  
 
We next compare cooperative and non-cooperative taxes. Given that the rent capture 
effect dominates the polluting-shifting effect, when there is no partial cross-ownership 
non-cooperative taxes are lower than cooperative taxes (see Kennedy, 1994). However, 
this result changes under partial cross-ownership. In country s the tax set in the cooperative 
and non cooperative cases decreases with the stake that its domestic firm has in the foreign 
firm. However, the cooperative tax decreases more than the non-cooperative tax with that 
stake since in the latter case the pollution-shifting effect dominates, which weakens the 
incentive to reduce the tax. As a result, the non-cooperative tax is higher than the 
cooperative tax when the stake is great enough. In country r the tax set in both cases 
increases with the stake that foreign investors have in the domestic firm. However, the tax 
set in the non-cooperative case increases more than the tax set in the cooperative case with 
that stake since in the first case the pollution-shifting effect dominates the rent capture 
effect, which provides an additional incentive to increase the tax. As a result, the tax set in 
the non-cooperative case is higher than the tax set in the cooperative case if the stake is 
great enough. Therefore, if the stake is great (small) enough, both countries set a lower 
(higher) tax in the non-cooperative case. Finally, if the stake takes an intermediate value, 
country s (country r) sets a lower (higher) tax in the non-cooperative case. 
 
We extend the model to analyze whether the results obtained in the paper change 
when pollution is transboundary. Denote as transboundary spillovers the degree to which 
environmental pollution spills over to trading partners. We find that when transboundary 
spillovers are great enough cooperative taxes are higher than non-cooperative taxes. As the 
incentive to transfer production (and, thus, pollution) to the other country is weaker, the 
higher the value of transboundary spillovers the weaker the pollution-shifting effect is. 
Therefore, transboundary spillovers weaken the incentive of each country to raise the tax to 
send production abroad. As a result, when transboundary spillovers are great enough, the   7
cross-ownership effect is weak enough to raise the taxes set by the governments above the 
cooperative taxes. When transboundary spillovers are low enough, we obtain a result 
similar to when environmental damage is purely local. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 
and 4 analyze the environmental taxes set by governments in the cooperative and non-
cooperative cases respectively. Section 5 considers transboundary spillovers and Section 6 
draws conclusions. 
 
2. The model 
 
We consider a world market comprising two countries denoted by 1 and 2. There is 
one firm located in each country and the two firms produce a homogeneous good whose 
production process damages the environment. Firm i is located in country i, i=1, 2. There is 
free trade and the firms sell their products in the world market. There are no transportation 
costs, and there is no possibility of discriminating between consumers from different 
countries. 
 
We assume that partial cross-ownership exists. Firm 1 owns the α percent of the 
stock of firm 2, α<1/2; thus, it does not have a share in its rival’s decision making. Firm 1 
is owned by a single owner. As firm 1 owns α percent of the stock of firm 2 it chooses the 
output level q1 that maximizes π1+α π2. Firm 2 chooses the output level q2 that maximizes 
(1–α) π2. We assume that investors from country 1 own firm 1 and thus α percent of the 
stock of firm 2. The rest of the stock of firm 2, (i.e. the 1–α percent) is owned by investors 
from country 2.  
 
The inverse demand function of country i is given by: p = A – 2yi, i =1, 2, where p is 
the world market price of the good and yi is the amount of the good sold in country i. 
Therefore, demand from the world market is given by the following inverse demand 
function: p = A – q1 – q2, where y1+y2 = q1+q2. Let qi denote the amount of the good that 
firm i sells on the world market. The consumer surplus in country i is given by:    8
 
CSi = (yi)
2, i =1, 2.            (1) 
 
There is a pollutant associated with the production of the good. Specifically, each 
unit of output causes one unit of pollutant emissions. However, firms have technology 
available for abating this pollution. Firms can abate emissions, and so we denote by ai the 
abatement level of firm i. As a result, the total pollutant emissions level of firm i, ei, is: ei = 
qi – ai. Abating emissions entails a positive cost, and the total cost of pollution abatement 
is given by: C(ai) = k (ai)
2. 
 
Firm i pays an environmental tax, ti, per unit of pollution emitted. This tax is chosen by 
government i. Therefore, the total taxes collected by government i, are Ti = ti ei. Given that 
each firm has to pay an environmental tax per unit of pollution emitted, the profit of firm i is: 
 
πi = (A – qi – qj – c) qi – ti (qi – ai) – k (ai)2, i≠ j; i, j= 1, 2.           (2) 
 
We consider local environmental damage and, thus, the polluting emissions of each 
firm affect only the country in which the firm is located. Specifically, we assume a quadratic 
functional form in the emission level to measure the environmental damage caused in 
country i by firm i:
10  
 
Di = λ (ei)
2, i =1, 2.             (3) 
 
where parameter λ measures the valuation of the environment by government i.  
 
The social welfare function considered by government i comprises the consumer and 
producer surpluses in country i (denoted by CSi and PSi, respectively) the total taxes 
                                                           
10 The literature on the environment usually assumes that environmental damage is a convex function of the 
total pollution level. See, for example, Falk and Mendelsohn (1993), Van der Ploeg and Zeeuw (1992), Ulph 
(1996), and Bárcena-Ruiz (2006).   9
collected by government i (Ti) and the environmental damage caused by the production 
process in country i (Di). Specifically, the social welfare function for country i is: 
 
Wi = CSi + PSi + Ti – Di, i=1, 2,          ( 4 )  
 
where PS1 = π1 + α π2 and PS2 = (1 – α) π2.  
 
  We consider the following timing. In the first stage, environmental taxes are set 
simultaneously. In the second stage, the firms simultaneously choose their output and 
pollution abatement levels. We solve the game by backward induction from the last stage of 
the game to obtain a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. For the sake of simplicity we 
assume that k=1 and λ=1. The main results hold for values of parameters k and λ other than 1.  
 
3. Optimal environmental taxes in the cooperative case. 
 
Next we consider the cooperative policy outcome denoted by superscript C. In that 
case, countries set the taxes that maximize the joint welfare of the two countries. In the 
second stage, firms simultaneously choose the output and abatement levels that maximize 
their objective functions. As firm 1 owns α percent of the stock of firm 2 it chooses the 
output level q1 that maximizes π1+απ2. Firm 2 chooses the output level q2 that maximizes (1–
α)π2. Solving these problems we obtain the equilibrium output and abatement levels, as a 
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a = .   (5) 
 
From expression (5) we obtain that the output level of firm 2 increases with parameter 
α while the output level of firm 1 decreases with this parameter, for a given value of t1 and 
t2. When firm 1 chooses the output level q1 it takes into account how it affects the profit of its 
rival. Thus, the higher the value of parameter α the lower the output level of firm 1, q1, and 
the higher the output level of firm 2, q2. Moreover, the output of industry decreases with   10
parameter α, which means that cross-ownership reduces market competition. Expression (5) 
also shows that  2 i i t a = , which is just the usual condition that firm i abates pollution to the 
point where marginal abatement cost equals the tax. 
 
Next we solve the first stage of the game. In this stage the taxes t1 and t2 are chosen 
such that the joint welfare of the two countries, W1+W2, is maximized. Solving this we 
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It is easy to see from (6) that environmental taxes are strategic complements 
( , 0 / > ∂ ∂ j i t t i∫j; i, j=1,2); that is, if the tax set in one country rises (falls) the tax set in the 
other country also rises (falls). Denote by 
C t  the tax set in the two countries when there is 
not partial cross-ownership (i.e. when α=0); in this case the model is symmetric and both 
governments set the same tax. Solving, we obtain the following result. 
 
Proposition 1. When environmental taxes maximize the joint welfare of the two countries: 
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C C W W
, 
C C W W 2 1 > . 
 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
  Given that in the cooperative case environmental taxes maximize the joint welfare of 
the two countries these taxes are chosen for efficiency reasons. As we consider imperfectly   11
competitive firms whose production process generates pollution that damages the 
environment two effects have to be taken into account (see Barnett, 1980) to explain the 
result shown in this proposition: first, the underproduction associated with the exercise of the 
market power of firms (the underproduction effect); and second, in the absence of 
environmental policies polluting firms do not internalize the environmental damage caused 
by their polluting emissions (the pollution-internalization effect). Thus, when there is not 
partial cross-ownership (i.e. when α=0) a tax on pollutant emissions reduces the 
environmental damage caused by firms but also causes firms to reduce their production 
further (from already sub-optimal levels). Therefore, the underproduction effect dominates 
and thus environmental taxes are below marginal environmental damage to avoid an 
excessive reduction in production by firms.
11 In this case, as the model is symmetric, 
equilibrium taxes are harmonized, which means that both governments set the same tax, 
C t . 
 
Under partial cross-ownership an additional effect arises (the cross-ownership effect) 
that influences the two effects mentioned above. First, for given taxes, cross-ownership 
reduces the output of industry and thus market competition. As a result, the 
underproduction effect (and thus the incentive of governments to lower taxes) is 
strengthened; this effect is the same for both governments since both countries obtain the 
same consumer surplus. Secondly, for given taxes, as firm 1 owns α percent of the stock of 
firm 2 it reduces its own production and emissions with parameter α, which is taken 
advantage of by firm 2 to increase its own production and emissions. As a result, cross-
ownership strengthens (weakens) the incentive of the countries to increase the tax paid by 
firm 2 (1) to get this firm to internalize the damage caused by its pollutant emissions. 
Therefore, in country 1 the underproduction effect dominates and thus 
C t1  decreases with 
parameter α. However, in country 2 the pollution-internalization effect dominates and thus 
C t2  increases with parameter α. This means that taxes are not harmonized and the tax set in 
country 2 (1) is higher (lower) than when there is no cross-ownership: 
C C C t t t 2 1 < < .
12 
                                                           





C for all α, i=1, 2. 
12 As the underproduction effect is strengthened by the cross-ownership effect, marginal environmental 
damage is greater than the tax in both countries.   12
 
The environmental damage suffered by the two countries decreases with parameter α. 
The tax set in country 1 (and thus its abatement level) decreases with parameter α, which has 
less effect than the reduction in its output level, implying that its emission level and the 
environmental damage decrease with this parameter. The tax set in country 2 (and thus its 
abatement level) increases with parameter α, which has a greater effect than the increase in 
its output level, implying that its emission level and the environmental damage decrease with 
this parameter. Finally, environmental damage in the two countries is lower than when there 
is no partial cross-ownership, and the environmental damage is greater in country 2 than in 
country 1 due to the greater pollutant emissions of firm 2. 
 
As the producer surplus in country 1 increases with parameter α while the producer 
surplus in country 2 decreases with this parameter, the effect of cross-ownership on the 
producer surplus implies that  0 / 1 > ∂ ∂ α
C W , 0 / 2 < ∂ ∂ α
C W  and 
C C W W 2 1 > . As the reduction 
in the social welfare of country 2 has a greater effect than the increase in the social welfare of 
country 1, joint welfare decreases with parameter α (0 / ) ( 2 1 < ∂ + ∂ α
C C W W ). 
 
4. Optimal environmental taxes in the non-cooperative case. 
 
Next we consider the non-cooperative case, denoted by superscript NC. In the second 
stage, firms simultaneously choose the output and abatement levels that maximize their 
objective functions. Solving these problems we obtain expression (5). In the first stage of 
the game, governments simultaneously set the environmental taxes that maximize their 
social welfare functions, given by (4). Solving these problems we obtain the reaction 
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   13
As in the cooperative case, taxes are strategic complements. Denote by tNC the tax set 
by each government when there is not partial cross-ownership (i.e. when α=0). From (7) 
we obtain the following result.  
 
Proposition 2. In equilibrium: 
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NC NC W W
, 
NC NC W W 2 1 > . 
 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
  Given that there is strategic interaction between governments when setting 
environmental taxes, when there is no partial cross-ownership the result obtained in this 
proposition is explained by two effects: first, the rent capture effect, which lowers 
equilibrium taxes as each country attempts to gain a competitive advantage over the other 
(a unilateral reduction in the domestic tax rate has the potential to raise net exports and so 
permits the capture of rent from foreigners); and second the pollution-shifting effect, which 
raises equilibrium taxes as each country attempts to transfer production and its associated 
pollution to the other country. 
 
Under partial cross-ownership an additional effect -the cross-ownership effect- arises 
that influences the two effects mentioned above. First, as partial cross-ownership reduces 
market competition the profit of both firms increases with parameter α and the incomes   14
obtained by the investors of country 1 (2) increase (decrease) with this parameter. This 
means that the incentive to reduce taxes to capture rents from foreigners (the rent capture 
effect) is weakened (strengthened) in country 1 (2). Second, for given taxes, firm 1 (2) 
produces and pollutes less (more) than when there is no cross-ownership. This means that the 
incentive to increase taxes to send production and thus its associated pollution to the other 
country (the pollution-shifting effect) is weakened (strengthened) in country 1 (2). 
 
The pollution-shifting effect dominates in country 2, which means that its tax increases 
with parameter α. Thus, the abatement level of firm 2 increases also with this parameter. 
However, in country 1 the rent capture effect dominates, implying that its tax decreases with 
parameter α. As a result, the abatement level of firm 1 decreases with this parameter. Given 
that 
NC t1  (
NC t2 ) decreases (increases) with parameter α, it is obtained that 
NC t2 >
NC t >
NC t1  
and thus the abatement level of firm 2 is higher than that of firm 1 (
NC a2 >
NC a1 ).  
 
As firm 1 takes into account how its output affects the profit of its rival firm, its output 
decreases with parameter α; firm 2 takes advantage of this to increase its output but as 
NC t2  
increases with parameter α, its output decreases with this parameter. However, firm 2 
obtains a greater market share than firm 1 (
NC NC q q 1 2 > ).  Although firm 2 has a greater 
market share than firm 1, as this firm pays higher taxes and abates more emissions it obtains 
lower profits (
NC NC
2 1 π π > ). Finally, as cross-ownership reduces market competition, the 
output level of the firms decreases with parameter α and, thus, the profit of the firms 
increases with this parameter.
13 
 
Given that the demand of the consumers of both countries is identical we get that both 
countries obtain the same consumer surplus (
NC NC CS CS 2 1 = ). Moreover, as the output of 
firm i decreases with parameter α, 
NC
i CS  also decreases with this parameter. Moreover, as 
investors from country 1 own α percent of the stock of firm 2, they obtain greater incomes 
                                                           
13 It must be noted that when firms do not pollute the environment and thus there are not environmental taxes, 
firm 2 produces more than firm 1 and obtains greater profits (see, for example, Malueg, 1992).   15
than the investors from country 2 (
NC NC NC PS 2 1 1 απ π + = >
NC NC PS 2 2 ) 1 ( π α − = ). Finally, 
NC PS1  increases with parameter α and 




NC a1 , as 
NC NC q q 1 2 > and 
NC NC t t 1 2 >  we obtain that 
NC NC T T 1 2 > . On the 
other hand, environmental damage is greater in country 1 than in country 2 (
NC NC D D 2 1 > ) 
since although firm 2 produces more output than firm 1 it also abates more emissions. The 
environmental damage suffered by the two countries decreases with parameter α since both 
the output and emission levels of the firms decrease with this parameter. Therefore, partial 
cross-ownership reduces environmental damage in both countries. 
 
Social welfare is greater in country 1 than in country 2 (
NC NC W W 2 1 > ) since the greater 
producer surplus has a stronger effect on social welfare than the lower environmental taxes 
collected by the government and the greater environmental damage. Social welfare in 
country 2 (1) decreases (increases) with parameter α since 
NC PS2  (
NC PS1 ) decreases 
(increases) with this parameter. However, the joint welfare of the two countries decreases 
with parameter α. 
 
We next compare the result obtained when governments set taxes cooperatively with 
that obtained when governments set taxes non-cooperatively. 
 
Proposition 3. In equilibrium: 
i) 
C NC t t 1 1 <  and 
C NC t t 2 2 <  if α<α2, 
C NC t t 1 1 <  and 
C NC t t 2 2 >  if α2<α<α1, 
C NC t t 1 1 >  and 
C NC t t 2 2 >  if α>α1, 0<αi<1/2, i=1, 2; 
ii) 
NC C D D 1 1 <  and 
NC C D D 2 2 <  if α<α4, 
NC C D D 1 1 <  and 
NC C D D 2 2 >  if α4<α<α3, 
NC C D D 1 1 >  
and 
NC C D D 2 2 >  if α>α3.
14 
 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 




i t t =  for α=αi (i=1, 2),  C NC D D 1 1 =  for α=α3, and  C NC D D 2 2 =  for α=α4, where α3>α1>α2>α4.   16
When each firm has a single owner (α=0) there is no cross-ownership effect and thus 
the rent capture effect dominates the polluting-shifting effect in the two countries, implying 
that equilibrium taxes are lower than the taxes set in the cooperative case (
C NC t t < ). Under 
partial cross-ownership both 
C t1  and 
NC t1  decrease with parameter α. However, 
C t1  decreases 
more strongly than 
NC t1  with parameter α since in the non-cooperative case the pollution-
shifting effect dominates the rent capture effect in country 1, which weakens the incentive to 
reduce the tax. As a result, 
NC t1  is greater than 
C t1  if parameter α is great enough (α>α1). On 
the other hand, under partial cross-ownership both 
C t2  and 
NC t2  increase with parameter α. 
However, 
NC t2  increases more strongly than 
C t2  with parameter α since in the non-
cooperative case the pollution-shifting effect dominates the rent capture effect in country 2, 
which provides an additional incentive to increase the tax. As a result, 
NC t2  is greater than 
C t2  
if parameter α is great enough (α>α2). Therefore, if α<α2 both countries set a lower tax in 
the non-cooperative case (the same result as when α=0). If α>α1 both countries set a higher 
tax in the non-cooperative case. Finally, if α2<α<α1, country 1 (2) sets a lower tax in the 
non-cooperative (cooperative) case. 
 
As the taxes set in both countries are higher in the cooperative case than in the non-
cooperative case when parameter α is low enough, environmental damage is lower in the 
first case if parameter α is such that α<α4. Note that if α=0, environmental damage is lower 
in the cooperative case. Moreover, as the taxes set in both countries are higher in the non-
cooperative case when parameter α is great enough, environmental damage is lower in this 
case if parameter α is such that α>α3. Finally, when α3>α>α4 environmental damage is 
greater in the non-cooperative (cooperative) case in country 1 (2). 
 
5. Transboundary pollution. 
 
We assume in this section that firms produce a homogeneous good whose production 
process causes transboundary pollution. The environmental damage generated in country i 
by firm i is now defined by: Di = λ (ei + sej)
2, i =1, 2, where parameter s measures the   17
degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners (transboundary 
spillovers). Parameter s varies between 0 and 1: s=0 means that damage is purely local, and 
s=1 means that emissions cause the same damage in the two countries. Transboundary 
spillovers increase with parameter s. The taxes set by the governments in the cooperative 
and non-cooperative cases are relegated to the appendix. 
 
It can be proved that only when parameter s is low enough can the taxes set by the 
governments in the non-cooperative case be greater than in the cooperative case (see Figure 
1). In fact, if transboundary spillovers are great enough (s≥0.0627), cooperative taxes are 
greater than non-cooperative taxes. When parameter s is low enough (s<0.0627), we obtain 
a similar result to when environmental damage is purely local.  
 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of taxes assuming transboundary spillovers. 
 
When parameter s is great enough, transboundary spillovers are also great enough 
which means that the incentive to transfer production (and thus pollution) to the other 
country is weaker. Thus, the greater the value of parameter s the weaker the pollution-
shifting effect is. Therefore, transboundary spillovers weaken the incentive of each 
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is great enough the taxes set by governments are lower in the non-cooperative case than in 
the cooperative case for all values of parameter α. This means that when transboundary 
spillovers are great enough the cross-ownership effect is weak enough to raise the taxes set 




There are many cases in which firms acquire a stake in their rivals that gives them a 
share in the profit but not in the decision making of those rivals. These passive investments 
affect the production and thus the pollutant emissions of the firms. As a result, partial cross-
ownership affects the strategic environmental policy of governments. This issue has not been 
examined by the literature that analyzes the environmental policy of governments. Thus, this 
paper examines the setting of cooperative and non-cooperative environmental taxes by 
government when there is partial cross-ownership.  
 
The design of environmental policy with imperfect competitive polluting industries 
has been analyzed considering different types of asymmetries between countries: 
sequential decisions on environmental taxes and various forms of international asymmetry. 
In this paper we consider a different asymmetry between governments. We assume that one 
firm owns a stake in its rival and that each firm is owned by investors of the country in 
which the firm is located. Thus, the ownership of the firms is asymmetrically distributed 
between the investors of the two countries.  
 
When countries set the environmental taxes that maximize the joint welfare of the 
two countries we find that equilibrium taxes are not harmonized and the firm that owns a 
stake in its rival pays less tax than when partial cross-participation does not exist while the 
other firm pays more tax. This result is also obtained in the non-cooperative case. 
However, the effects explaining these results differ from one case to the other, since in the 
cooperative case taxes are chosen by efficiency reasons while in the non-cooperative case 
they are chosen for strategic reasons. A comparison of cooperative and non-cooperative 
taxes reveals that if the stake that one firm has in its rival is great enough both countries set 
a lower tax in the non-cooperative case. If that stake is low enough, both countries set a 
higher tax in the cooperative case. Finally, if the stake takes an intermediate value, the   19
country whose firm has a stake in its rival sets a lower tax in the non-cooperative case 
while its rival sets a lower tax in the cooperative case.
  
 
  One possible extension of the paper is to consider that the investors of each country 
own half of the stock of each firm. Thus, both countries obtain the same producer surplus. 
In that case, it can be shown that the tax set in the non-cooperative case is greater than the 
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Proof of proposition 1 
 
 Let  ) 3 18 95 /( 1
2 α α + − = K . By computing the taxes that maximize the joint welfare 
of the two countries we obtain: 
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Let  ) 2 28 105 143 1352 /( 1
4 3 2 α α α α − + − − = H . From (7) we obtain the taxes set by 
the governments, the abatement level, the output and the profit of firms, the consumer and 
producer surpluses, the environmental damage, the total taxes collected by the governments 
and social welfare:  
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Proof of proposition 2 
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Proof of proposition 3 
 
Comparing the taxes and the environmental damage in the two cases considered we 
obtain: 
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strictly with parameter α, it is negative for α=0 and positive for α=1/2; therefore, there exists a 
value of parameter α, denoted as α3 (α3≈0.3920), such that 
NC C D D 1 1 − >0 if and only if α>α3. 
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positive. Moreover,  – ) 2 34 33 1373 7236 15592 3900 ( 6 5 4 3 2 α α α α α α − + − − + −   increases strictly 
with parameter α, it is negative for α=0 and positive for α=1/2; therefore, there exists a value 
of parameter α, denoted as α4 (α4≈0.2860), such that 




When there is transboundary pollution, environmental damage in country i is defined 
as:  Di=λ(ei+sej)
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